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Abstract 
Many academic authors, policymakers, NGOs and corporations have focused on top-down 
human rights global norm-making, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). What is often missing are contextual and substantive 
analyses that interrogate rights mobilization and linkages between voluntary transnational 
rules and domestic governance. Deploying a socio-legal approach and using a combination of 
longitudinal field and archival data, this article investigates how a local, indigenous 
community in Northern Chile mobilized their rights over a period of almost two decades. We 
found that rights mobilization was largely shaped by tensions between the different logics of 
legality and the business organization. In our case, the UNGP implementation process has 
been ineffective in giving rightsholders access to genuine remedy. On the contrary, it has led 
to weakened rights mobilization, dividing the local community. We conclude that greater 
attention to rights mobilization and domestic governance dynamics should be given in the 
Business and Human Rights debate.  
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The largest gold mining project in Chile, Pascua-Lama (valued at US$8.5bn), owned by the 
world’s largest gold mining company, Barrick Gold, was given the go-ahead in 2000, yet was 
ordered by domestic environmental authorities to shut down in 2018 - a decision that was 
reexamined by Chile’s Supreme Court in 2019. For almost two decades, this mine, which has 
strategic importance for Chile, as it is economically dependent on its mining industry (Moran, 
2014), has been disputed between communities, environmental activists, state authorities and 
the company. For at least six years of this dispute, Barrick has been employing UN guided 
human rights principles to deal with the rights claims by the community, making Pascua-
Lama an important test case for the business and human rights approach. 
Barrick Gold is one of the strongest supporters of the business and human rights 
approach (Dashwood, 2012). Since 2012, Barrick Gold has employed John Ruggie, the then 
UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights and architect of the UN Guiding 
Principles (UNGPs), as a special advisor. On their website, the company claims: 
“To help meet our commitment, human rights considerations have been embedded into 
Barrick’s values, governance frameworks and corporate management systems. From 
supply chain and human resources to security and community relations, Barrick 
considers it our responsibility to respect human rights throughout the business. We 
have developed a human rights program that is robust and comprehensive, strives to be 
consistent with the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs), and is tailored to the issues and 
circumstances in every location we operate.” (Barrick Gold, 2017) 
 
Many authors claim that there is great promise in the UNGPs, as human rights are “changing 
the logic of doing business in a fundamental way” (Wettstein, 2015: 275). However, business 
and human rights (BHR) scholars and activists are increasingly divided over the approach 
taken by the UNGPs (Mares, 2012; Deva and Bilchitz, 2013; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2017). 
Some advocate for the adoption of a legally binding UN BHR treaty (de Schutter, 2015; 
Bilchitz, 2016; Deva and Bilchitz, 2017), frustrated by the UNGPs voluntary approach. 
Others take a more pragmatic approach, focusing on improving the practical implementation 
of the UNGPs (Baumann-Pauly and Nolan, 2016; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2017). 
In this article, we identify two key problems with this polarized debate on BHR 
regulation. First, we detect a certain ‘de-territorialization’ of the regulatory response to 
human rights violations (Cutler, 2005; Bartley, 2018). As argued by Rodríguez-Garavito,  
there is a disconnection between “top-down, norm-making, and norm-implementation 
processes” and bottom-up initiatives made by “myriad communities along with local and 
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national organizations around the world [that] engage in campaigns, litigation, negotiations, 
and information politics” (2017: 9). We argue that there is a need for studies that interrogate 
the linkages between transnational regulation and the domestic context, characterized by 
differing political, economic and juridical circumstances (Bartley, 2018; Reinecke and 
Donaghey, 2015). Second, legal and business scholars in the BHR field tend to take law for 
granted, treating it as an exogenous force. In this article, we argue for a more sociological 
understanding of law as legality (Selznick, 1969; Edelman and Stryker, 2005; Edelman, 
2016), including a processual understanding of how rights are actually mobilized by people 
and communities, particularly those affected by large-scale developments. 
  Borrowing the concepts of ‘rights mobilization’ and ‘legal consciousness’ from socio-
legal literatures, this article sets out to address these shortcomings by using a combination of 
field and secondary data, analyzing the complexities and impacts of implementing the 
UNGPs from the perspective of rightsholders – a local, indigenous community – affected by 
the Pascua-Lama mine. Focusing our analysis on how the community has mobilized its 
human rights over a period of almost twenty years, this article shows how community 
activists have engaged with the mining company, local and national governments as well as 
with the legal system in different ways over time. Specifically, we employ Edelman’s 
theoretical framework (Edelman and Stryker, 2005; Edelman, 2016), helping us examine the 
dynamics of rights mobilization within the context of two main fields: the legal field (in our 
case the Chilean domestic legal system) and the business organization field (in our case 
Barrick). Our research question is hence: How has the affected local community mobilized its 
human rights in relation to the transnational business organization and the domestic legal 
field?  
This article makes three distinct contributions. First, we maintain that effective human 
rights protection and redress depends, to a large extent, on how and why the affected 
community groups mobilize their rights (McCann, 2010). Second, our analysis stresses the 
major role of domestic governance and the constitutive power of the legal field in shaping 
rights mobilization and business counter-mobilization strategies. Third, our study reveals how 
the adoption of the UNGPs has enabled the company to privatize the dispute, paradoxically 
resulting in weaker rights mobilization and a more divided local community.  
The article is structured as follows. We first review the relevant literatures on business 
and human rights, showing why a focus on rights mobilization is needed. We then introduce 
the Chilean case before discussing the research methods used. The case’s empirical findings 
are then presented in detail and subsequently discussed and theorized in light of the existing 
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literatures. Finally, we will conclude the article by outlining our contributions and the wider 
implications of our study. 
 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BRIDGING TRANSNATIONAL 
AND DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE 
Since its emergence, in the 1990s, the field of Business and Human Rights (BHR) turned into 
a “microcosm” (Ruggie, 2014: 6) of the broader debate on the extent to which public 
authorities can regulate the behaviour of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) (Strange, 1996, 
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; McBarnet et al., 2007; Bartley, 2018). Until recently, it was 
conventional wisdom that the responsibility for enhancing business’ respect for human rights 
lay with governments. However, an initial attempt to elaborate international legally binding 
norms failed in 2003 (Kinley et al., 2007). This led to the appointment of Professor John 
Ruggie as UN Special Representative and the endorsement by the UN Human Rights 
Council, in June 2011, of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) he had elaborated and negotiated (United Nations, 2011). The UNGPs provides an 
internationally accepted BHR framework for states and corporations and it is considered as 
the “most comprehensive discussion to date of the relationship between corporations and 
human rights” (Muchlinski, 2012: 145). Also known as the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
framework, the UNGPS features three pillars: a State duty to protect human rights; a 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and access to effective remedies for human 
rights abuses through judicial and non-judicial means.  
At the heart of the UNGPs is the view that globalization is diminishing the capacity of 
nation states and the international order to regulate MNCs as they expand their operations 
beyond the jurisdiction of their home countries. This is creating widening gaps in business 
governance that require a new decentralized and polycentric approach (Ruggie, 2014, 2017). 
In line with growing attention to the emergence of transnational business governance 
initiatives (Bartley, 2007; Sahlin-Andersson and Djelic, 2006; Bűthe and Mattli, 2011), the 
pragmatic solution proposed by Ruggie entails that MNCs play a stronger regulatory role in 
filling these gaps, especially when they operate in States that lack the willingness, capacity or 
resources to address human rights violations. In practice, corporations are required to adopt 
corporate human rights due diligence policies to see whether and how they are involved, or 
risk becoming involved, in human rights violations (Lambooy, 2010 Mares and Bird, 2014; 
Ruggie and Sherman, 2017). Also, where violations emerge, business responsibility to 
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respect human rights requires active engagement in providing remedy to victims, by itself or 
in cooperation with other actors (Lukas et al., 2016; Newton, 2019). As Ruggie clearly 
explained, this business responsibility is not based on legal obligations:   
“This responsibility […] is rooted in a transnational social norm, not an international 
legal norm. It serves to meet a company’s social license to operate, not its legal 
license; it exists ‘over and above’ all applicable legal requirements; and it applies 
irrespective of what states do or do not do.” (Ruggie and Sherman, 2017)  
 
The adoption and implementation of the UNGPs has been widely debated, attracting a large 
and varied academic literature (Mares, 2011; Deva and Bilchitz, 2013; Rodríguez-Garavito, 
2017). However, the BHR community is divided over the UNGPs’ effectiveness. Some 
express frustration over the voluntary nature of the UNGPs (Albin-Lackey, 2013; Deva and 
Bilchitz, 2013; Bard and Vo, 2016), advocating for the development of a legally binding UN 
treaty on business and human rights (de Schutter, 2015; Bilchitz, 2016; Deva and Bilchitz, 
2017). Others focus on the practical implementation of the UNGPs (Santoro, 2017; 
Rodríguez-Garavito, 2017; Fasterling, 2017). This debate concerns particularly Pillar III and 
the question of how to ensure access to remedy when human rights violations occur abroad. 
Some argue that the UNGPs encourages states and firms to fill the remedy gap (Olsen, 2017). 
Suggestions have been made to strengthen its application through the development of more 
effective operational grievance mechanisms (see Lukas et al., 2016; Thomson, 2017). Others 
maintain that the UNGPs approach is fundamentally flawed because it puts access to remedy 
into the hands of states and businesses that are often the liability-holders, creating a patent 
conflict of interest or at least weak incentives to redress abuses (Melish and Meidinger, 
2012). In practice, the majority of operational grievance mechanisms have been designed and 
implemented by target companies, neglecting the perspective of the victims (Kaufman and 
McDonnell, 2016; Coumans, 2017). Thus, some NGOs are calling for extraterritoriality 
norms to enhance corporate accountability for human rights violations committed overseas 
(Bernaz, 2013; Skinner et al., 2013). 
Against this polarized debate, we identify two major areas that should receive greater 
attention. First, there is a lack of studies that interrogate, in a specific context, the linkages 
between transnational business initiatives inspired by the UNGPs and domestic legal 
structures and governance. Because of its emergence in relation to the phenomenon of 
globalization, there is a tendency to ‘de-territorialize’ both human rights violations by MNCs 
and the regulatory response to them. De-territorialization broadly entails “detachment of 
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regulatory authority from a specific territory” (Brölmann, 2007: 86). De-territorialization 
processes are increasing the importance of a primarily networked organization of spatial 
power by replacing, in particular, the traditional role of the nation-state (Ó Tuathail and Luke, 
1994; Strange, 1996; Kobrin, 2008). On the contrary, re-territorialization processes can be 
defined as the restructuring of local forms of organization of spatial power, such as the 
nation-state (Popescu, 2010). As argued by Cutler (2005: 199), “critical globalization studies 
in law means the development of a critical understanding of the dialectical relationship 
between the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of law.” Drawing on Bartley (2018), 
we argue that low- and middle-income countries are too often treated as ‘empty spaces’ that 
need to be rescued by the international community in the form of corporate due diligence 
mechanisms, binding international treaties and extraterritorial regulation. However, what is 
often forgotten is that, beyond this empty spaces imagery, domestic governance is filled not 
only by the activism of local communities, but primarily by governmental agencies, domestic 
laws and tribunals, as well as local authorities (Bartley, 2018; Banerjee, 2018). This 
underscores the need for understanding the unique role of the state in pluralist fields of 
governance, such as the UNGPs regime. In particular, it suggests a closer and more 
substantive enquiry of how the implementation of the UNGPs into corporate policies and 
practices interplays with domestic legal, political and socio-economic contexts.  
Secondly, we argue that part of the problem is that scholars in the BHR field tend to 
treat law as an exogenous force imposed from above on business and other actors (Melish 
and Meidinger, 2012; Bernaz, 2013; Deva and Bilchitz, 2017). As such, law is often taken for 
granted as an independent variable: either invoked as a coercive and determinative force or 
dismissed as mere business compliance. A substantive and contextual understanding of BHR 
regulation could be enhanced by adopting a more sociological consideration of law as 
‘legality’ and a renewed focus on rightsholders, their legal consciousness and capacity to 
mobilize their rights (Selznick, 1969; Edelman and Stryker, 2005; Santos and Rodriguez-
Garavito, 2005).  
 
RIGHTS MOBILIZATION: STUDYING DISPUTE PROCESSES FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF RIGHTSHOLDERS  
To develop a more critical, substantive and contextual approach to BHR regulation, we 
suggest it is productive to borrow insights from the socio-legal research. In particular, we 
draw on research that has studied the problematic enforcement of US anti-discrimination laws 
following landmark social reforms promoted, since the 1960s, by the civil rights movement 
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(Brigham, 1996; McCann, 2010; Edelman, 2016). Our analytical framework, illustrated by 
Figure 1, is based on three intertwined elements: rights mobilization, legal consciousness and 
legality.  
 
{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
 
The phenomenon of rights mobilization was first explored in a host of empirical studies that 
emerged in the US since the 1960s and 1970s (McCann, 2010). For the scope of this study we 
prefer this term to the popular, yet narrower, concept of legal mobilization. According to 
Zemans’ (1982: 700) definition, “The law is […] mobilized when a desire or a want is 
translated into a demand as an assertion of rights”. Rights mobilization provides an important 
‘bottom-up’ contribution to the BHR debate by emphasizing that laws, norms or even 
corporate policies are of very limited use if rights are not mobilized by the affected 
communities or individuals. Thus, it responds to frequent calls for rights-based and bottom-
up approaches to BHR regulation (Melish and Meidinger, 2012; Kaufman and McDonnell, 
2016; Coumans, 2017). Its main focus is on ordinary people’s response to (un)perceived 
injurious experiences.  
Rights mobilization has been theorized as a longitudinal, dynamic, multistage process 
of disputing among various parties. To mobilize rights, individuals or communities must first 
recognize a rights violation (naming), then attribute the violation to a legally responsible 
party (blaming), and lastly take action to seek redress for the violation (claiming). This 
widely adopted three-step process, known as “naming, blaming, and claiming” (Felstiner et 
al., 1980), is often perceived by the rightsholders as complex and daunting. There is extensive 
evidence that the vast majority of individuals whose rights are violated take no formal action 
to redress those violations, particularly if they have limited social power or economic 
resources (Galanter, 1974; Miller and Sarat, 1980; Nielsen et al., 2010). In fact, many 
individuals do not even recognize when a violation of their rights has occurred, or they may 
believe that recurring to legal redress could lead to retaliation or is simply futile. In other 
words, rights mobilization depends at least in part on a second key element: legal 
consciousness. 
Legal consciousness can be defined as the understanding of the meaning of law and 
rights by individuals or groups as they engage, avoid, resist or just assume the law and legal 
meanings (Ewick and Silbey, 1991; Brigham, 1996). In particular, Brigham (1996) identifies 
“rights, rage, and remedy” as three significant forms of how legal conventions prefigure, 
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frame and express the aspirations and world-views of social movements. Subaltern groups 
and relatively powerless citizens often have limited capacity to engage with legal discourses, 
knowledge and language against more powerful groups and organizations. Thus, they are less 
likely to successfully mobilize their rights or even perceive injurious experiences.  
Most of the literature on dispute processes has gradually shifted towards Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR), dialogue and conflict resolution (cf. Menkel-Meadow, 2000, 
2004). Following this trajectory, the UNGPs presents human rights due diligence and non-
judicial grievance mechanisms as tools to identify and address “any legitimate concerns” 
before they “may over time escalate into more major disputes and human rights abuses” 
(UNGPs, p. 32).  Thus, the current debate on the operationalization of the UNGPs emphasizes 
firm-community dialogue and participatory processes as means to prevent and resolve BHR 
disputes (Kaufman and McDonnell, 2016; Thompson, 2017; Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu, 
2016; Tamir and Zoen, 2017). 
Lastly and relatedly, understanding law as legality helps explaining the social 
structures within which rights mobilization and legal consciousness evolve over time. In 
particular, our analytical framework (Figure 1) draws on Edelman’s approach to legality 
(Edelman and Stryker, 2005), which offers two relevant insights to our study. First, she has 
developed a comprehensive theory of the interplay between law and business organizations, 
based on her research on courts, corporations and civil rights (Edelman, 2016). Building on 
the ‘bottom-up’ approach taken by rights mobilization and legal consciousness researches, 
the author stresses the ‘endogeneity of law’. That is “the meaning of law is shaped by widely 
accepted ideas within the social arena that law seeks to regulate” (Edelman, 2016: 12). Thus, 
deploying a sociological theory of fields, she conceptualizes law and organizations as 
overlapping social fields (Bourdieu, 1987; Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012), which she calls ‘legal field’ and ‘business organizational field’ (see Figure 
1). This approach differs from the focus on actors – NGOs, corporations, public authorities, 
etc. – taken by most of the BHR literature. By stressing that there are fundamental tensions 
between the different core logics of legality and business fields, this approach contributes to 
our understanding of the interplaying rationalities, languages and social structures deployed 
by business organizations and legal institutions to frame BHR matters (Branco, 2008; 
Wettstein, 2012).  
Furthermore, Edelman (2016) contributes to the emerging literature on counter rights 
mobilization, corporate backlash and group-based resistance (cf. Boutcher and Chua, 2018) 
by finding that one important reason for continuing racial and gender discrimination in the 
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workplace is a process that she calls ‘managerialization of law’. This is often spurred by 
some combination of social movement activity and perceived legal threats, which Edelman 
calls ‘legalization of organizations’ (Figure 1). She shows that - as a response to the 
legalization process - business organizations typically create law-like ‘symbolic’ structures 
that “demonstrate attention to law and, therefore, lend legitimacy to organizations in the eye 
of the law” while “maintaining sufficient flexibility to preserve managerial prerogatives and 
practices that are seen as advancing business goals” (2016: 31-32).  
This is relevant for the scope of our enquiry because these corporate law-like 
structures include the typical ‘new governance’ mechanisms supported by the UNGPs, such 
as corporate human rights policies that look like legal norms as well as grievances 
mechanisms and corporate appeal procedures that are similar to judicial and law enforcement 
systems. We argue that Edelman’s explanatory framework offers valuable insights to explain 
how the interplay between UNGPs-inspired transnational business structures and domestic 
governance shapes rights mobilization. We will now explore these dynamics in the Pascua-
Lama case in Chile. 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
Case Selection and Research Context 
Since the question of rights mobilization and the UNGPs has not been greatly examined in 
the literature so far, we find the use of a qualitative contextualized case study most 
appropriate (Edmondson and McManus, 2007; Pettigrew, 2013). In particular, it enables to 
“observe everyday life through interpretative frameworks, to get close to the context of the 
study, and to reveal unfolding social processes” (Pettigrew, 2013: 124). The case selection 
was based on the anticipation of the opportunity of developing a theory by learning about 
various hypotheses and their observable implications in a specific context (Stake, 1995; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The Pascua-Lama dispute represents an unusually revelatory 
case (Yin, 2017), able to offer theoretical insights to explore the transformations of human 
rights mobilization and the interplay between domestic and transnational business 
governance. In many ways, this lengthy dispute – starting in 2000 and still ongoing at the 
moment of writing – represents a familiar case of rights mobilization by an indigenous 
community against a mega-mining project that menaces its very existence (Bebbington et al., 
2008; Bruijn and Whiteman, 2010; Maher, 2019a). The local mobilization appears even more 
significant because of the extreme environmental conditions in which it is taking place and 
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the unlikely capacity of the residents to stop the largest gold mining company in the world 
(Li, 2017). The paradigmatic nature of this dispute has attracted, from the very beginning, a 
vast echo, including some academic interest (Urkidi and Walter, 2011, Cavallo; 2013, Smith 
and McCormick, 2013; Arboleda, 2015; Li, 2017; Maher, Valenzuela and Böhm, 2019). 
While our study builds on previous analyses, it aims to deploy a more comprehensive socio-
legal explanatory framework of material and symbolic struggles, focusing on the 
community’s rights mobilization.  
  The fragile Huasco Valley can be described as a fertile oasis snaking its way down 
from the Andes in the middle of one of the driest deserts on Earth. The valley is famous for 
its plump olives, pisco and a celebrated wine, known as pajarete, and it is home of a rural 
community (4,840 people) of which about half belongs to the Diaguita indigenous group. 
Almost 70% of the houses are adobe buildings, and 75% of the working population has not 
completed standard schooling (Urkidi, 2010). Notably, the initial phase of the Pascua-Lama 
dispute coincided with the struggles of the Diaguita people to be legally recognized by the 
Chilean government. At an altitude of between 3800 and 5200 meters, the mine is believed to 
contain 18 million ounces of gold and 600 million ounces of silver with a planned investment 
of US$8.5bn. During droughts, the locals struggle to get access to the limited available water, 
and thus water and fertile land are of sacred and invaluable to them. By seriously threatening 
the existence of three glaciers (known as Toro 1, Toro 2, and Esperanza), on which depends 
their access to freshwater, the local communities perceive the Pascua-Lama mining project as 
a direct threat to their existence. As noted by Li (2017:15), “Pascua-Lama’s contested 
glaciers can help to elucidate the dynamics of recent mining conflicts and unsettle theoretical 
assumptions about resources.” 
  The significance of the case is also enhanced by the profile of Barrick Gold, the 
largest gold miner in the world and owner of the Pascua-Lama mine. This Canadian company 
holds a special place in the BHR debate, having been implicated in a variety of other conflicts 
with communities worldwide. For example, analysts have reported on rapes of women 
community members by Barrick’s security forces at its Porgera mine, Papua New Guinea. 
The corporation has been praised by some for the way it has implemented a grievance 
mechanism in Porgera where it was advised by John Ruggie (Human Rights Clinic, 2015). 
However, most of the literature takes a critical lens towards Barrick’s legacy at Porgera 
(Kaufman and McDonnell, 2016; Coumans, 2017) as well as in other countries, such as 
Tanzania (Mining Watch Canada, 2017). 
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There is a key difference between Pascua-Lama and other human rights disputes in 
which Barrick has been involved. Significant barriers to remedy and justice exist both in 
Tanzania and Papua New Guinea due to limited domestic governance and weak judicial 
systems. These cases fit the conventional imaginary of human rights violations perpetrated by 
MNEs in so-called ‘areas of limited statehood’ (Borzel and Risse, 2010). Thus, it has been 
acknowledged that Barrick’s remedy mechanism provided victims with a remedy that many 
otherwise would have been unlikely to receive (Human Rights Clinics, 2015). In contrast, the 
Chilean state has a more developed governmental and judicial system, although it is 
considered to have insufficient environmental and human rights legislation (Cavallo, 2013). 
In this sense, Pascua-Lama provides a more significant research context to study how the 
interplay between private transnational governance and domestic circumstances shape human 
rights mobilization. 
   
Data Collection 
Our research covers a period from 2000 to May 2019, from the beginning of the dispute to 
the current situation where a judicial decision to permanently close the mine is being 
challenged in the courts. Actual data gathering started in 2012, and during this long period we 
adopted an iterated, inductive approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), strategically looking for 
information sources that could fill our information gaps. Overall, our dataset combines 
multiple sources: 74 interviews (58 with local residents, four with local politicians, three with 
national NGO activists and two with BG representatives); participant observation; archival 
data. Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes all our data sources. Most of the interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and translated (the authors are fluent in Spanish).  
The international prominence of the case helped our analysis of the dispute, because 
of the availability of a vast amount of archival information. The data collection comprises 
various phases. We began in 2012 by analyzing publicly available data. Initially, this case 
study formed part of a larger project that sought to understand the influences and explanatory 
factors for community positions towards eight nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile. 
Then, in 2012, the lead author completed a first participatory observation, living with the 
local community, participating in meetings and conducting a series of interviews through 
snowballing sampling. Initial access to this close-knit community was through OLCA, an 
environmentalist NGO, but soon a relation of trust was established with key members of the 
community, facilitating meetings with different groups (e.g. indigenous people, small 
farmers, activist, politicians and the local clergy). Interviews were focusing on an overview 
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of the dispute process, the valley, the impact of the project and possible grievances. In total, 
20 people were interviewed and this material was invaluable to identify the position of the 
main community groups. Since 2013, we have been reviewing newsletters and had consistent 
electronic communication platforms (WhatsApp, Skype and emails) with three community 
leaders/residents on the dispute, and completed two interviews in 2015 at international events 
with a community leader. A second participant observation and series of field interviews took 
place in September 2017. Despite the suspension of the mine, this time the community was 
deeply divided and mobilization was depressed. Thus, the interviews with 22 residents and 
two politicians focused on the community fractions, mapping the position of the groups and 
rights mobilization transformations. A third research visit to the Huasco Valley was 
undertaken in February 2019 where the field researcher interviewed 15 residents and two 
politicians. This third trip was valuable since it allowed us to gauge perceptions after Pascua-
Lama had been legally ordered to close by Chilean courts in January 2018. 
As the Pascua-Lama dispute has attracted substantial public attention and there is a 
wealth of secondary data, particularly produced by various civil society groups opposing the 
mine, our understanding of this case has also been greatly aided by an analysis of a 
substantial amount of archival documents. They include technical and media reports, video 
documentaries and interviews, and legal documents dating from 2000 to 2019. We consulted 
a total of 61 such archival sources (including videos). In particular, various legal documents 
and the records were collected and analyzed in 2018 and 2019, as the legal domain became 
increasingly central to our research (see also Table 1 in the Appendix). 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis started in May 2017, following an inductive approach. Internal discussions and 
interdisciplinary synergies helped us to make sense of the data and identify major themes, 
pertaining to rights mobilization and business logics whilst often going back to the raw data, 
pedaling back and forth between the raw data, themes, processual dynamics and our research 
question (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Raw data were separately analyzed and then discussed 
together by the authors against the literature and our emerging analytical framework. As the 
complex narrative started to become clear, we used an iterative method of aggregating 
findings and analytical tools provided by the rights mobilization literature to construct our 
emerging theorization.  
We soon realized during our first data analysis that a major shift occurred in the 
community between 2012 and 2017, which we analyzed as a shift from resistance to 
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acquiescence; that is, from a community broadly united in fighting against the corporation to 
one deeply divided and increasingly resigned. Thus, we asked ourselves what explained this 
change. We used open first order coding to identify chronological changes in the mobilization 
of the affected community against the project, focusing on the interplay between the 
community and other two actors, the corporation and the state. However, we realized that by 
focusing only on the actors some key elements that shaped the transformation of the dispute 
risked to be missed. In particular, we considered that symbolic struggles needed greater 
attention. Thus, we deployed rights mobilization (naming, blaming and claiming) and legal 
consciousness of the various local groups (e.g. mistrust of the legal system and the state, 
awareness of rights violations, uncertainty about legal outcomes) as central analytical tools in 
explaining the shift from resistance to acquiescence. This led us to identify second-order 
themes (naming, blaming, claiming, law response to community, and changing CSR 
strategies), which better captured the interplay between the community’s rights mobilization, 
legality and business, understood as social fields. Once we agreed that rights mobilization 
was central in explaining the transformation of the dispute, we studied the dynamics of rights 
mobilization by the community over time. First, we considered the transformations in rights 
mobilization in relation to the legal and business social fields. Second, following Langley 
(1999), we organized the rights mobilization process into cumulative and partially 
overlapping phases in which the meaning and practices of rights mobilization changed, yet 
various elements of the previous phase remained. Consequently, we present our findings 
“within a chronological timeline to evidence how specific dynamics take place within a given 
moment and how they evolve across time” (Reay et al., 2018: 10). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In this section we discuss how rights mobilization has changed over a period of almost two 
decades in the context of a significant and complex human rights dispute between Barrick 
Gold, a global mining company, and the Huasco Valley community in Chile. The affected 
community accused Barrick’s Pascua-Lama mining project of having a severe negative 
impact on freshwater resources as well as land and indigenous rights. In our longitudinal 
study, we focus on the perspective of the affected local community. In accordance with our 
theoretical framework (see Figure 1), we aim to investigate how the community’s rights 
mobilization has been affected by the interplay between the domestic governance (the legal 
field/legality) and transnational private regulation (the organizational field/Barrick Gold). As 
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summarized in Figure 2 below, we identify three distinct phases in the dispute. Each phase 
differs in terms of the relationship between legal and organizational fields and the response of 
the affected community to perceived violations of their fundamental rights. 
  
{FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE} 
  
Phase I: Dispute Antecedents [2000 – 2006] 
Following the ratification, in 2000, of a bilateral mining treaty between the states of Chile 
and Argentina, Barrick Gold was able to create a so-called ‘third state’ in the Andes,  between 
the two borders, exclusively managed by the mining company. This extraterritorial status 
allowed Barrick to mine gold and silver without facing legal obstacles in either country 
(Quevedo et al., 2004). This unusual power can be illustrated by the fact that public officials 
or civil society had to give a 15-day formal notice to Barrick before being allowed to enter 
what was internally known as the ‘Barrick Republic’ (Globe and Mail, 2014). Soon after, 
Barrick submitted its initial Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in order to start mining. 
In the EIA, Barrick planned to move three glaciers in order to gain access to the deposits 
beneath them. They would be moved to another glacier with which they were to bond (Li, 
2017). 
  
Rights Mobilization against the Barrick ‘Third State’ 
Rights mobilization in the Huasco Valley began around 2000 as the community became, 
quite accidentally, aware of the project. Quickly, the community decided to “fight off these 
big mining companies invading our land!” because “those who are not from the valley do not 
understand the sacred value of the water and the land, the Mammu Ashpa, as we say in our 
language” (Interview, community leader C, 2012). In this initial phase, the community was 
very united against the mega-project. By 2005, according to a poll by the main newspaper in 
the region, 97% of the Huasco Valley community was against the Pascua-Lama mine (Diario 
Chañaricillo, 2005). 
  As noted by Felstiner et al., the earlier stages of naming, blaming and claiming are 
crucial to determine the following transformations of rights mobilization, “not only because 
of the high attrition they reflect, but also because the range of behaviour they encompass is 
greater than that involved in the later stages of disputes, where institutional patterns restrict 
the options open to disputants” (1980: 636). These early stages reflect social stratifications as 
well as personality traits and individual characteristics that explain why people do – or do not 
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– perceive an experience as an injury, blame someone else, claim redress or manage to get 
their claims accepted. Notably, the community’s initial perception that their fundamental 
rights had been violated (naming) was framed around two non-legal rationales. 
  First, most of the local community perceived the project as a violation of the sacred 
value of water in this arid region. This popular feeling was supported by both Christian and 
more ancestral norms and believes. Second, some groups, particularly landowners, stressed 
the potential ruinous economic impact of the mega-mining project, with the glaciers helping 
to sustain agricultural production in the valley downstream (Li, 2011). Both clearly emerge 
from our interviews: “Water is life and the mine represents destruction to the valley” 
(Interview, community leader C, 2012); “The most sacred for the Diaguitas are the mountains 
[…] where you can find the spirits of our tatai (ancestors). From these mountains life comes: 
la co, ko, which means water” (email correspondence with community leader C, 2013); 
“Without water we cannot continue to grow the sweetest grapes for export, or avocados, 
watermelons and other crops” (Interview, community resident C, 2012). 
  
Crucially, the local clergymen legitimized this process of collective awakening after having 
obtained the support of national environmental NGOs such as OLCA: “the priest gave mass 
on the riverbed to show the importance of the water and OLCA with other locals painted the 
church, walls and organized lots of marches against Barrick” (Interview, community leader, 
C, 2012). Rapidly, the community became very assertive in attributing to the company a 
responsibility for a long list of violations and abuses (blaming). The community was 
particularly offended by the fact that Barrick had omitted the existence of glaciers in its initial 
EIA: “We, the Diaguitas, never forgave them for that” (email correspondence with 
community leader C, 2013). 
  Starting in 2001, multiple smallholder farmers consistently blamed Barrick for 
negatively affecting the quality of the water and creating water scarcity. However, despite all 
the accusations mentioned above, the affected community did not seek legal redress 
(claiming) from Chilean courts until 2012. Their accusations were translated into public rage, 
marches and community meetings where abuses were discussed and denounced. This 
situation has a twofold explanation. The community mistrusted the state, blaming it for being 
‘in bed with’ Barrick. Indeed, they deemed the bilateral mining treaty to be unconstitutional, 
feeling abandoned by the state (Quevedo et al., 2004). In the words of our interviewee Sergio 
Campusano, President of the Huascoaltinos cooperative farmers, “the State of Chile has not 
respected our basic right to decide what we want for our development […] Our community 
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was intentionally ignored by the State of Chile...because we oppose mega-mining 
development within our land” (Protestbarrick.net, 2010). Furthermore, the Pascua-Lama 
project brought to light the difficulties in accessing redress and protecting indigenous access 
to water when domestic human rights and environmental laws are not in place and fully 
harmonized with international standards (Cavallo, 2013). 
 
Translocal Business and Human Rights 
The absence of state and legal actors is striking in the initial phase of the dispute. Pascua-
Lama’s extraterritoriality perfectly illustrates what scholars call transnational private 
regulation, defined as “a de-territorialized form of authority where governments offload 
regulation to the private sector, partly reflecting neoliberal ideas about the power of markets 
to solve social problems” (Bartley, 2018: 12). As part of Pascua-Lama de-territorialization, it 
is significant that Barrick initially disregarded the glaciers’ existence. The glaciers were only 
later included in the EIA. As Li (2017) notes, from Barrick’s organizational perspective, 
glaciers, mountains and rivers tend to be seen as resources to be managed, while for the locals 
they make up people’s sense of place, their identities, and ways of life. 
  The cession of sovereignty by the Chilean and Argentine governments to a 
transnational business organization is an extreme example of the declining authority of the 
State that characterize neoliberal globalization (Strange, 1996). Firm-community relations are 
not embedded in the more vertical nation state modes of governance. Drawing on Banerjee’s 
concept of translocal governance, “communities make alliances with other communities and 
local actors and firm-community interactions tend to be direct and not mediated by 
participation in larger forums” (2018: 811). In our case, the firm-community conflict rapidly 
escalated from the Huasco Valley to a transnational scale via innovative forms of ‘networked 
activism’ (Land, 2009). The OLCA NGO helped local activists to communicate their 
concerns to international activist networks, such as Canadian NGOs ‘Protest Barrick’ and 
‘Mining Watch’, which had begun covering the dispute. Between 2004 and 2006, major street 
protests against Pascua-Lama were organized not only in Chile but also in Barcelona, 
London, Cambridge and Toronto (Urkidi and Walter, 2011). From 2004 onward, in an 
attempt to attack Barrick at home, these accusations were publicly directed against the 
company by Campusano during the Annual Shareholder Meetings in Toronto. They were also 
repeated in many street rallies, town meetings and university or public lectures about the 
violation of Huascoaltinos’ rights across the globe (Protestbarrick.net, 2010). 
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  As the opposition to the project mounted, Barrick’s response was equally direct, 
trying to bargain local support for the project by launching massive welfare investments and 
CSR projects. Between 2003 and 2005, Barrick spent US$16 million to co-fund - with the 
local and regional government - housing and education projects in the region (Barrick Gold, 
2018). In 2006, the company signed a contract with large wealthy farmers, worth US$65 
million over 20 years, for monitoring and improving the water supply (Barrick Gold, 2018). 
The indigenous community accused the company of having paid the sum to obtain the 
farmers’ powerful support as pointed out in numerous interviews during our fieldwork. 
Arguably, this strategy was effective with public authorities. In 2006, the environmental 
regulator approved an amended version of the mining project with 400 conditions (Barrick 
Gold, 2018). The company could finally start its Pascua-Lama operations. The decision only 
increased the community’s rage and perception of distress and injustice (OLCA, 2006). It also 
fuelled mistrust toward the Chilean state and judicial system. Significantly, in November 
2006, the community staged a ‘citizens’ tribunal’, with testimonies and judges that would 
determine abuses and responsibilities that the State  was averse to sanction, and emit a verdict 
on Barrick’s activities (Miningwatch Canada, 2006). 
  
Phase II: Dispute Legalization [2006 - 2013]  
Once the project officially started in 2006, rights mobilization also began to be transformed. 
The mounting public rage was gradually transferred into more formal legal actions against 
Barrick. The community took the dispute to various international and eventually national 
courts, seeking redress for the alleged violations. Meanwhile, the Chilean state strengthened 
its human rights and environmental legislation, also in response to the growing public 
concern created by mega-mining projects such as Pascua-Lama. As a result, Barrick was 
forced to become more responsive to public authorities and the affected population, 
reframing its actions through legal tools and according to the domestic legal order. 
  
Re-centering the State 
In contrast to Phase I, during Phase II the state and judicial system became much more 
assertive in protecting human rights and the environment. In particular, the situation changed 
after the election of socialist President Bachelet (2006-10). The Chilean State started 
strengthening its human rights and environmental legislation. In September 2008, Chile 
ratified ILO 169 on indigenous peoples’ rights. Two years later, in Bachelet’s penultimate 
month in office, the government also introduced important environmental reforms that came 
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into force in 2012. Law 20600 entailed the creation of new environmental courts, specialized 
and independent jurisdictional entities that are under the supervision of the Supreme Court 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2018). The law also established the 
Superintendency of the Environment (SMA), a decentralized public service with legal 
authority, subject to the supervision of the Ministry of the Environment. The SMA was 
granted the power to prosecute environmental violations (SMA, 2018), something which had 
the potential to appease the growing number of environmental conflicts in the country. 
  At the same time, the limitations of Pascua-Lama’s transnational private governance 
soon became evident. Multiple complaints kept emerging from community residents about 
the impact of the mine operations to the local watershed, accompanied by hundreds of 
publicly available videos evidencing contamination (e.g. Pascua-Lama, El llanto de la 
Montaña, video, 2015). “Pollution will be and is high. The river turned red in January and 
February due to mine testing by Barrick, we depend on this river!” (Interview, local leader C 
and later B, 2012). This regulatory failure triggered a major shift in the relationship between 
the organizational and legal fields, re-centering the authority away from the company towards 
the state. The company was forced to focus more on compliance with domestic law, engaging 
in costly lawsuits. Immediately after its creation in 2012, the SMA began conducting 
inspections at Pascua-Lama. Between 2012 and 2013, the residents filed various lawsuits 
against Barrick. In January 2013, part of the canal system at Pascua-Lama collapsed. Barrick, 
coming increasingly under pressure, self-denounced to authorities for severe infractions of 
their environmental permit (SMA, 2013). Various local community groups also filed 
complaints against Barrick to the newly established SMA for faulty construction of the 
perimeter channels and failure to fulfil the mine’s glacier monitoring plan. In April, the 
residents obtained the suspension of Pascua-Lama via the Court of Appeals in the city of 
Copiapó.  In May 2013, after conducting onsite investigations, the SMA ordered Barrick to 
suspend all operations and charged the company with a record fine of around US$16m 
(SMA, 2013).  
  During this phase, Barrick did not fundamentally change its counter-mobilization 
tactics, based on privatized welfare and CSR investments in exchange for a social licence to 
operate (e.g. the ‘Atacama Commitment’). It was forced to become more responsive to legal 
discourses about the constitutional and indigenous rights of the affected community. For 
instance, in 2008-9, Barrick offered to pay for legal services necessary for local communities 
to gain indigenous status from Chilean authorities, affording them access to certain social, 
economic and state benefits. However, rights were still framed through business logics, seen 
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as a form of ‘bargaining’ dispute resolution (Menkel-Meadow, 2014). Barrick also 
demonstrated greater attention to the affected community, beyond wealthy landowners. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the company completed over a thousand local community 
consultations. As a result, in 2009 Barrick announced a community monitoring programme 
for local residents to independently test the water quality (Barrickbeyondborders, 2017). 
Despite its efforts, according to our data, traditional CSR investments and community 
dialogue were ultimately ineffective in shifting the community opposition to the mining 
project. The following quote from the Director of OLCA suggests the company’s strategy 
remained de-territorialized, responding to transnational organizational logics external to the 
Valley: 
“Those initiatives, finally of course, have a communicational impact externally but 
internally it is not so clear whether they achieve the impact that they [Barrick] want, 
because they do not manage to completely dissolve the opposition to the project.” 
(interview with Director of OLCA, 2017) 
  
Claiming for Human Rights Protection 
The legalization of the dispute and the decision by the SMA to suspend the project and fine 
Barrick US$16m can be largely attributed to a significant change in the affected community’s 
mode of rights mobilization, from public rage to legal claiming. This corresponds to a 
transformation in their legal consciousness (Ewick and Silbey, 1991). Rage, as an ideological 
discourse, often identifies government and judicial instruments “with oppression rather than 
protection” (Brigham, 1996: 310). Thus, the Huasco Valley community found it hard to move 
away from mobilization by rage to reliance on judicial and governmentally produced rules. 
This shift also depended on the adoption of human rights and environmental law reforms by 
the Chilean government, which created “legal opportunity structures” for the affected 
community (Anderson, 2005). 
  In this phase, legal forms came to infuse the language, strategies and ideals of the 
Huasco Valley community. Given their mistrust of the Chilean state, it is not surprising that 
the Huascoaltinos went first to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) 
rather than the Chilean courts, filing a case against the Chilean State for failing to protect 
their rights (IACHR, 2009). In 2009, the Commission declared the admissibility of their 
petition, submitted in June 2007, accusing the Chilean state of violations of the rights to 
property, to access to justice, and to participation (IACHR, 2009). Even though the 
Commission did not reach a final decision on the case, this episode strengthened and 
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legitimized the community’s legal consciousness, their shared beliefs and ideas related to the 
acceptance of legal concepts and compliance. According to Campusano, this opened “a 
window” and gave “new hope for the defence of the Huasco Valley” (Protestbarrick.net, 
2009). The process of legalization of the dispute reached its peak in 2011-2013 when all three 
groups of community rightsholders from the Huasco Valley filed various legal claims against 
the company. However, some differences started to emerge. While activists and NGOs saw 
the legal battle as a new means to continue the protests and campaigns, others from the valley 
decided to sue Barrick looking for compensation. As explained by one grape farmer, “We 
need to get compensation from them if they dry our water supplies” (Interview, community 
leader A, 2012). A local community leader commented: “the mine won’t ever leave the valley 
and the government will always back them so they need to pay us compensation for the 
damage they’ve already done and comply with the environmental permit they received” 
(Interview, community leader A, 2012).  
  Consistent with the rights mobilization literature, this transformation in the legal 
consciousness of the affected community was facilitated by the role of ‘cause lawyers’  (Sarat 
and Scheingold, 1998). Cause lawyering consists in using legal skills to bring about social 
change and it tends to have an ambivalent relationship with social movements, swinging 
between serving them and seeking control (see Sarat and Scheingold, 2006). In particular, 
much of the legalization of the dispute was driven by the work of a lawyer named Lorenzo 
Soto who first met a group of Diaguita in 2012. In terms of legal consciousness, it is 
significant that they told Soto that they did not believe they could derail the project through a 
legal challenge, because it already had a license and had been under way for years (Globe and 
Mail, 2014). In October 2012, the Copiapó Court of Appeals accepted the constitutional 
complaint (writ of amparo) submitted by Soto and signed by 500 Diaguita residents against 
Pascua-Lama (Elmostrador.cl, 2012). Then, in April 2013, following the collapse of part of 
the canal system at Pascua-Lama, Soto obtained a first suspension of Pascua-Lama via the 
Copiapó Court. 
  
Phase III:  Suspended Between Legal and Organizational Logics [2013 - 2019] 
This latest phase is dominated by legal ambiguity and uncertainty following the suspension of 
mining by the SMA. Despite a lengthy investigation and judicial process, as of May 2019, 
there is not a clear judicial outcome, and it is unsure whether Barrick will have to 
permanently close the mining project. As a consequence, the future of  Pascua-Lama and the 
Huasco Valley remains uncertain. This stalemate profoundly affected the community’s legal 
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consciousness and rights mobilization. The community is increasingly divided between two 
alternative logics to solve the Pascua-Lama dispute. A fraction keeps following the logic of 
‘rights’, relying on judicial claims and governmental protection. Another follows the business 
organizational logic of ‘bargaining’ through forms of ‘privatized remedy’. 
 
Divided and Depressed Rights Mobilization 
Until 2013, the community was largely united against the Pascua-Lama project and rights 
mobilization remained strong. During this phase rights mobilization weakens and the 
community becomes deeply divided. There are two main causes of this shift. First, the mining 
suspension created a situation of ambiguity and legal uncertainty that negatively affected the 
community’s legal consciousness. It revived mistrust of the state and cynicism about the real 
possibility of stopping the mining. Second, the uncertainty exacerbated pre-existing 
differences within an exhausted community between those motivated by strong social norms 
about the (sacred) value of water and others acting mainly out of economic concerns for this 
essential natural resource. 
Barrick now became more effective in exploiting this fault line. In fact, following a 
failed attempt to obtain the permanent closure of the project in court, lawyer Soto convinced 
part of the Diaguita community to come to an out-of-court settlement with Barrick. That was 
concluded in January 2014, whereby the plaintiffs agreed to drop all accusations against 
Barrick. Four months later, Barrick managed to sign with these and other community groups 
(15 out of 22 Diaguita neighbourhoods) a UNGPs-inspired Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). In a logic of ‘bargaining’ their rights, immediately after the ratification of the MoU, 
lawyer Soto suggested that the Diaguita people could be paid an ‘indigenous royalty’ to 
resolve the conflict (Reuters, 2014).  
The arbitrations and MoU marked a cleavage in the mode of rights mobilization. 
Having lost faith in judicial and governmental redress mechanisms, part of the community 
opted for what we call here ‘privatized remediation’. As Brigham (1996: 313) notes, “The 
remedial form of law in society puts forth the settlement of conflict as an overriding concern. 
[...] It follows and is an extension of the progressive revolt against formal processes in the 
courts.” On the other hand, OLCA and the Huasco Valley activists formally and informally 
contested the MoU process, arguing that it lacked open participation and transparency and 
involved  manipulation, bribes, intimidation and coercion (Wiebe, 2015). Our interviews 
confirm that those taking part in the MoU process received a monthly payment “for our time 
and participation in the process” (Interview, community leader C, 2019). According to a local 
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leader, “they were also discussing compensation for future impacts, that is like mortgaging 
our conscience (...) meaning if Barrick destroyed a glacier in the future and we complained 
they would reply ‘but we’ve paid you for that!’” (Interview, community leader B, 2019).  
 
Crucially, ‘privatized remedy’ is an agreement between private parties, beyond state 
jurisdiction. This is problematic because the Chilean government “takes no responsibility for 
compliance or the legality of the agreement” and “does not support or monitor the negotiation 
or the execution”, thus the balance of power “is asymmetrical and communities are without 
legal recourse” (activist Lucio Cuenca, cited by Wiebe, 2015: 13). This was confirmed as in 
June 2014 a formal claim against the MoU filed to the Indigenous Affairs Department 
(CONADI) was rejected because the state could not intervene in a private agreement between 
Barrick and the Diaguita. One claimant later commented that CONADI “turned its back on 
us” (El Ciudadano, 2018). Divisions within the community escalated as the community 
leaders that signed the MoU were publicly called “vendidos” (sellouts) by the activists, while 
those who signed the MoU accused the activists and OLCA of making a living out of this 
dispute, being funded by foreign governments who want permanent conflict in the Valley. 
         Only a fraction of the indigenous community – led by OLCA and the Huasco Valley 
activists – kept fighting Barrick through judicial mechanisms, asking for the permanent 
closure of the mine. Between 2016 and 2017, the SMA completed a new investigation on the 
environmental impact of the mine, decreeing, in January 2018, the “total and definitive 
closure” of Barrick's Pascua-Lama mine in addition to the imposition of a fee of $11.5 
million, citing serious environmental infractions (SMA, 2018). In a series of press releases, 
OLCA celebrated this remarkable success by recalling a 17-year conflict during which they 
witnessed “all the strategies of division, co-optation, interventions, harassments, discredit 
[…] that produced exhaustion and insecurity that deeply impacted the territory” (OCMAL, 
2018). However, according to our sources, most of the locals remained hesitant about the 
outcome. As one of the residents told us, “I’ll believe it when I see it” (Interview, community 
leader C 2019). Sergio Campusano cautiously noted after the January 2018 ruling: “One 
could say that we won a battle, but not the war to mining contamination in our territory.” In 
March 2019, Chile’s Supreme Court revoked the SMA’s decision and sent the case back to 
the Environmental Court for review by a different panel of judges. The new judicial process 
could last for months, further extending the community’s perception of legal ambiguity and 
uncertainty. 
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Legal Ambiguity and the Managerialization of Human Rights 
The prolonged condition of legal ambiguity and uncertainty is hardly surprising as judicial 
processes are notoriously lengthy, contingent and indeterminate (McCann, 2010). However, it 
is interesting to note that Barrick exploited this situation by changing its counter-mobilization 
strategy. While in the previous two phases it relied on privatized welfare to obtain a social 
licence to operate; during this period it adopts law-like corporate structures and mechanisms 
inspired by the UNGPs. They demonstrate formal attention to human rights discourses, 
community dialogue and transparency, lending much-needed legitimacy to the business 
organization. Drawing on Edelman (2016), we call this process ‘managerialization of human 
rights’. In essence, this consists of adopting business organization structures that mimic the 
public legal order in form, for example see the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (Maher, 
2019b). They demonstrate attention to law and, therefore, lend legitimacy to organizations. 
At the same time, they allow to maintain “sufficient flexibility to preserve managerial 
prerogatives and practices that are seen as advancing business goals” (Edelman, 2016: 30).  
  Our data show that Barrick decided to launch its Human Rights Compliance 
Programme in 2011, inspired by the UNGPs. Consistent with Barrick’s de-territorialized 
form of private authority, this had nothing to do with the Pascua-Lama case. In fact, it was a 
global response to the vast echo provoked by an investigation revealing human rights 
violations in its Porgera mine, Papua New Guinea. Essentially, the Programme entailed the 
adoption of corporate policies and processes such as human rights due diligence processes, 
company-based grievance mechanisms to report violations, and corporate structures to 
investigate them (Barrick Gold, 2017). Jonathan Drimmer, former Deputy Director of the 
U.S. Justice Department, was hired to oversee its implementation, and John Ruggie, the 
architect of the UNGPs, was appointed as Special Advisor. In 2013, the new Programme 
spread to Barrick’s Pascua-Lama’s operations. Its application included the creation of a 
network of “offices located in the communities to directly engage with local stakeholders” 
and the adoption of a variety of tools “including a grievance mechanism, public meetings, 
door to door visits […]. On average in 2014, [their] team engaged with over 650 stakeholders 
each month” (BHR Resource Centre, 2015) While OLCA and the Huascoaltinos activists 
constantly denounced Barrick’s human rights strategy as a subtle attempt to divide and co-opt 
a ‘fragile’ and ‘disoriented’ community (Asamblea por el Agua del Guasco Alto, 2015), 
according to Barrick, the launch of its internal grievance mechanism in the Huasco Valley 
was finally “giving the communities a voice” (Barrickbeyondborders, 2013). We found that 
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these new practices allowed Barrick to exert greater control over the territory and the 
resolution of the Pascua-Lama dispute.  
  Ultimately, OLCA and the Huascoaltinos activists’ judicial engagement was 
instrumental in the SMA decision to order the definitive and total closure of the mine in 
January 2018. This decision halted the process of disintegration of the community and finally 
granted legal certainty. However, the SMA did not revoke Barrick’s environmental permit. 
Thus, the company could interpret the sentence as a “re-evaluation process”, ordering only 
“the closure of existing facilities on the Chilean side of the project” (Barrick, 2018). Finally, 
in March 2018, a pro-market liberalization President, Sebastián Piñera, took office, replacing 
socialist President Bachelet. One year later, Chile’s Supreme Court decided to reexamine the 
permanent closure. Barrick commented that “last month [Barrick CEO] met with Chile’s 
Minister of Mining Baldo Prokurica”, and “Chile is an investor-friendly country, with a 
significant mineral endowment, and which encourages the development of mining projects” 
(Barrick Gold, 2019). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our study has analyzed how a community, affected by a large-scale mining project, has 
mobilized its rights in relation to both the transnational business organization (Barrick Gold) 
and the domestic legal field (in Chile). We were motivated by two shortcomings in the 
existing BHR literature. First, there is a lack of studies that interrogate, in a specific context, 
the linkages between transnational voluntary initiatives - such as the UNGPs - and domestic 
governance structures and dynamics. Second, the BHR literature tends to adopt a formalistic 
and exogenous approach to law. By deploying a set of socio-legal concepts – rights 
mobilization, legal consciousness and legality – we have provided a more critical and 
contextual analysis of the dynamics of firm-community BHR disputes (Bartley, 2018; 
Banerjee, 2018; Levy et al. 2016). Taking the perspective of the affected local community, 
we have been particularly focused on how rightsholders mobilize their rights in the interplay 
between the differing logics of the business and legal fields. In this section, we further 
discuss our findings, offering theoretical reflections about the dynamics of rights mobilization 
in BHR disputes, particularly identifying two key dynamics: de- and re-territorialization, on 
the one hand, and legalization and privatization of the dispute on the other. 
 
{FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE} 
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Figure 3 provides a visual overview of our theoretical analysis of how rights mobilization has 
evolved in our case over time, identifying key processual dynamics of rights mobilization in 
the interplay between the domestic legal field and the transnational organizational field. With 
Edelman (2016), we can theorize the different core logics of the two overlapping fields, 
generating tensions that became explicit in Phase II, then exploding in Phase III. In particular, 
the legal field tends to frame rights mobilization in terms of ‘entitlement’, meaning the 
normative criteria according to which an individual or a group should be qualified to enjoy 
rights. On the other hand, as Branco (2008: 18) noted, the business organization “feels more 
comfortable when dealing with wants than with rights; [...] satisfying wants implies the use of 
concepts like cost, benefit and price”, framing the world in terms of resources management 
and efficiency. This business logic repeatedly emerges in our case. For example, Barrick 
focuses on water and the glaciers as resources to be managed efficiently (Li, 2017), 
responding to rights mobilization by offering forms of ‘privatized welfare’ to satisfy the 
material needs and wants of the community. Barrick consistently tries to bargain human 
rights, offering benefits to the community. In the logic of the legal field, these issues are 
framed very differently: the (un)lawful conduct by Barrick, irregularities, lack of compliance 
with the company’s environmental permit and failure of protecting the environment and the 
affected community (Phase II). 
Drawing on Brigham’s (1996) work on ‘rage, rights, and remedy’, our study has 
revealed that rights mobilization in the Valley was initially expressed by a united community 
through public ‘rage’, against both the Chilean state and Barrick, fuelled by a mix of religious 
values and economic motives (Phase I). This rage was an expression against the de-territorial 
and translocal nature of the dispute. The community was then gaining trust in the legal field, 
partly because of political changes in Chile, increasingly framing the situation through 
‘rights’: legal claims, relying on governmental rules and legal opportunity structures (Phase 
II). Yet, then, the community became deeply divided (Phase III), torn apart between a 
fraction that continuously relied on judicial mechanisms and another that opted for out-of-
court arbitration and UNGPs-inspired ‘privatized remedy’. Each of these processual 
dynamics was facilitated by different intermediaries: the clergy and NGOs; cause lawyers; 
negotiators and arbiters.  
While most of the BHR literature appears polarized along the divide between 
voluntary UNGPs and the adoption of a binding UN treaty (Baumann-Pauly and Nolan, 2016; 
Deva and Bilchitz, 2017), we argue that both perspectives are based on the assumption of the 
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decreased importance of nation-states and the need to fill ‘governance gaps’ (Kobrin, 2009; 
Ruggie, 2014; 2017). During the last two decades, the conventional wisdom has been that the 
problems arising from the globalization process are rooted in the asymmetry between 
increasingly interconnected economic activities and the territory-bound validity of state 
regulation and bureaucracy (Habermas 2001; Sherer et al., 2016). Poor and middle-income 
governments have been often described as too submissive to powerful corporations 
(Banerjee, 2008, 2010) and Western governments as privileging sovereignty and non-
intervention over the protection of human rights (Kobrin, 2009). Thus, extraterritorial, 
international and voluntary multi-stakeholder ‘fast-track’ solutions have been invoked to 
strengthen human rights protection, bypassing the state (Bernaz, 2013; Skinner et al., 2013; 
Rodríguez-Garavito, 2017). Our study maintains that this view should be reversed. Inspired 
by Bartley’s (2018: 45), we found it more fruitful to start from the premise that “sites of 
implementation are crowded with actors, agendas and rules”, rather than treating them as 
empty spaces waiting to be filled by transnational standards. Hence, we have analyzed in 
detail the processes of rights mobilization from below and the linkages between private 
transnational rules and domestic judicial and governmental enforcement mechanisms. 
Theorizing the changing nature of rights mobilization in the Pascua-Lama case (Figure 3), 
our study highlights a more dynamic and dialectical relationship between processes of de-
territorialization and re-territorialization of BHR governance and legalization and 
privatization of human rights disputes. 
 
Dynamics of de- and re-territorialization 
Here we introduce a dialectic perspective in the analysis of BHR governance that conceives 
of de- and re-territorialization dynamics as entangled. As already noted by Rodríguez-
Garavito (2017), much of the current debate about BHR governance appears to take a ‘top-
down’ approach disconnected from the struggles of local and national communities and 
organizations engaged in campaigns, litigations and negotiations on the ground.  
Our study revealed a tension between two models of governing BHR conflicts. On the 
one hand, transnational business organizations, like Barrick, try to impose a new form of de-
localized transnational private authority, by-passing and replacing the traditional role of the 
nation-state (Ó Tuathail and Luke, 1994). As illustrated by other BHR analyses (see Kaufman 
and McDonnell, 2016; Human Rights Clinics, 2015; Coumans, 2017), corporate decisions are 
taken independently from local identities and ways of life, based purely on organizational 
logics of resource efficiency and good managerial practices. In the absence of the state, firm-
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community interactions become inevitably more direct and are re-organized through the 
reality of transnational corporations increasingly engaged “in authoritative decision making 
that was previously the prerogative of sovereign states” (Cutler et al. 1999: 16; Sherer et al., 
2016). This is evident in Phase I, characterized by Barrick’s de-territorialized private 
authority, fully supported by the Chilean state. Drawing on Banerjee (2018), we call this 
governance framework ‘translocal business and human rights’ because the national 
dimension is bypassed in favor of either transnational or local dynamics. Firm-community 
interaction is conflictual (‘rage’), without being mediated by public fora. We found that rights 
mobilization in Phase I mirrors corporate transnational dynamics, operating through 
networked advocacy groups (Land, 2009). This ‘deterritorialization’ of the dispute reemerged 
in Phase III, as Barrick’s new form of corporate BHR governance, which we call ‘privatized 
remedy’, inspired by the UNGPs, is being implemented ‘top down’ in the Huasco Valley, 
based on changes in its global corporate human rights policy.  
However, on the other hand, our case has shown that there are also less explored re-
territorialization dynamics, suggesting the emergence of a ‘place-conscious’ model of BHR 
governance (Bartley, 2018: 258). They are partly based on restoring the authority away from 
the company towards more traditional state-centric governance due to the perceived failure of 
business organization in performing a regulatory role. The capacity of Chile’s state and legal 
system allowed for an increased trust of the community in the legal field, leading to a re-
territorialization of the dispute (from Phase I to II), meaning that firm-community interaction 
became indirect, mediated by the logic of legality and public fora, “re-centering the state” 
(Bartley, 2014; 2018). From 2006, hence, rights mobilization became re-configured from 
translocal actions to domestic dynamics: all community groups were increasingly attracted 
into strategic legal actions, reflecting and deepening reliance on domestic legal frames and 
judicial redress mechanisms. Barrick, in this phase, had no choice but to comply with 
domestic rules (e.g. self-denounce to authorities) and suspend the mine.  
 
Dynamics of legalization and privatization of the dispute 
Another dialectic relationship that emerges from the study concerns legalization and 
privatization dynamics. The legalization of the dispute consists in transferring blame into 
more formal legal claims. Our study has shown the importance of rights mobilization and 
legal consciousness and the unique perception of injurious experience suffered by the 
affected community (Felstiner et al., 1980; McCann, 2010), particularly in the early stages of 
rights mobilization (naming and blaming), to explain the evolution of the dispute and the 
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possible involvement of state authorities and formal legal institutions (claiming). Against the 
idea of law as an exogenous force, whereby access to justice should be granted to the affected 
community by either the international community or by privatized transnational governance 
(Scherer et al. 2016; Kobrin, Ruggie and Sherman, 2017), our study stressed the ‘constitutive 
power’ of law (Brigham, 1996). This means to recognize that individuals and groups think as 
well as act on the basis of legal values and understandings that shape their perceptions, 
aspirations and calculations (Ewick and Silbey, 1998; McCann, 2010). This can be seen most 
clearly in Phase II as all the community’s groups are increasingly attracted into strategic legal 
actions. Thus, we agree with Bartley that treating the state as just one of many relevant actors 
and structures in fields of transnational governance “would be a mistake, as states are unique 
in their capacity to shape market access on a large scale and institutionalize the rights of 
citizens and firms within their borders” (2014: 95). It is important to realize that in times of, 
what we called, de-territorialization of human rights governance, the state and the legal field 
are still present, providing access to legal remedy to rightsholders. BHR analysts should 
therefore not forget the possibilities offered by the legal and regulatory systems in specific 
national circumstances. The legalization of the Pascua-Lama  dispute constitutes a “paradigm 
change”, as the founder of Barrick, Peter Munk, said at Barrick’s 2013 AGM, due to “new 
governments, punitive governments, more aggressive regulatory systems, driven by a whole 
cadre of trained and highly competent lawyers” (CHRE, 2013). 
Our case shows that Barrick continuously strives to privatize the dispute, avoiding the 
intermediation of legal logics and public fora, using a range of counter-mobilization 
strategies, from private welfare programmes (Phase I and II) to forms of privatized remedy 
(Phase III). Both corporate strategies mimic the public order in form to gain legitimacy, 
concealing the prevalence of business logics and private authority. ‘Privatized welfare’ is 
very common in the extractive industry and well-documented (Banerjee, 2018). It entails a 
vast investment by the business organization in the provision of public goods – e.g. housing, 
education, and services for disabled children (Barrick, 2008) – that are usually state 
prerogatives. In our case, privatized welfare was rejected by the community (Phases I and II) 
as economic benefits were widely perceived as incommensurable to the value of water. 
‘Privatized remedy’ consists in devising law-like corporate policies and structures 
(e.g. grievances mechanisms and due diligence processes) for dispute management and 
resolution similar but alternative to the legal system. This can be theorized as a form of 
‘managerialization of law’ (Edelman, 2016), or, more precisely, managerialization of rights. 
This was achieved through the creation of corporate structures and processes in the form of 
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an UNGP-inspired MoU, which was designed to lend legitimacy to Barrick in the eye of the 
legal field, while maintaining managerial flexibility, keeping a firm eye on the main goal of 
gaining a social licence to operate for the Pascua-Lama mine. It appears as a form of 
‘bargaining in law’s shadows’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979), enabled by mistrust toward 
judicial solutions in a context of legal ambiguity (Edelman, 2016). Analytically, this is an 
important point: corporate BHR programmes are not only implemented in the face of an 
absent state, or within ‘governance gaps’, as many authors argue (Ruggie, 2014; 2017). 
Instead, in our case, the corporation’s UNGP-inspired programme actively counter-acted the 
legal field. Privatized remedy appealed to part of the community because it offered a 
legitimate settlement, through a predictable and formally independent remedy process, to the 
victims of human rights abuses, allowing them to move forward. However, privatized remedy 
mechanisms devised by Barrick weakened rights mobilization and, during Phase III, we 
found the affected community increasingly divided, pulled in opposite directions by the 
quasi-magnetic force (Martin, 2003) of the organizational and legal fields.  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Analyzing the dynamics of rights mobilization by the community and the transformations of 
the Pascua-Lama dispute, our study has provided three relevant contributions to the debate on 
BHR regulation. First, going beyond the current BHR policy debate, polarized between 
transnational ‘new governance’ and international legally binding solutions, we argue that 
both approaches overlook rights mobilization from below as they tend “to move in one 
primary direction: from ‘higher’ international frameworks to ‘lower’ individual actors” 
(Melish & Meidinger, 2012: 313). Drawing particularly on Bartley (2018) and mobilizing a 
body of socio-legal research and conceptual tools (Ewick and Silbey, 1998; McCann, 2010; 
Edelman, 2016), we have advanced a broader analytical model of studying BHR disputes, 
centered around three intertwined elements: rights mobilization, legal consciousness and 
legality.  
In particular, we have found that effective human rights protection and redress 
depends, to a large extent, on how and why the affected community groups mobilize their 
rights. The UNGPs and a large part of the BHR community tend to underline the role of 
exogenous factors – e.g. state-based or corporate-led mechanisms – in providing effective 
redress to victims of human rights violations. However, our analysis shows that endogenous 
factors, such as ‘legal consciousness’ and ‘rights mobilization’, are equally, if not more, 
 30 
 
relevant to explain access to effective redress. Arguably, judicial or non-judicial mechanisms 
would have been of very limited value if the Huasco Valley residents did not mobilize their 
rights against the Pascua-Lama project. As Melish and Meidinger (2012: 313) note, there is a 
tendency to “undervalue the critical role of local actors in both creating relevant human rights 
meaning in accordance to local values, mores and conditions and, equally important, in 
holding actors accountable to such meanings in locally effective and meaningful ways.” We 
argue that it is through strengthening its legal consciousness that the community achieved a 
legalization and hence, what we call, a re-territorialization of the dispute. In other words, the 
rights mobilization from below led to a significant shift in the dynamics between the business 
and legal fields. 
Second, our analysis stresses the major role of domestic governance and the 
constitutive power of legality. This is in line with Bartley’s (2018) call for going beyond the 
imaginary of ‘empty spaces’ toward ‘place-conscious transnational governance’ by 
rethinking much of the conventional discourse of ‘bypassing the state’ that informs the BHR 
debate. In fact, both the advocates of the UNGPs (Ruggie, 2014) and those supporting a 
legally binding UN Treaty (Deva and Bilchitz, 2017) tend to start from the same premises of 
‘governance gaps’ and the inadequacy of domestic laws in a context of economic 
globalization (Habermas 2001; Kobrin, 2009; Scherer et al., 2016). Instead, we have found 
that this centrality of law persists even when the state is absent (Phase I). For example, the 
Huasco Valley community felt strongly that “the State of Chile [that] has not respected our 
basic rights” (Protestbarrick.net, 2010). This is because, “the law is real, but it also is a 
figment of our imagination”, as Scheingold puts it (1974: 3). We suggest that this paradox 
can be explained by going beyond the current emphasis on instrumental dimensions of law to 
appreciate the ‘constitutive power’ of law as ‘legality’. ‘Constitutive’ means that “legal 
conventions routinely prefigure, delimit, and express the expectations, aspirations, and 
practical world-views of subjects” (McCann, 2010: 527). Accordingly, as Brigham (1996: 
313) notes, despite being “ostensibly [...] opposed to the legal process”, even the provision of 
‘privatized remedy’ by Barrick (Phase III) “in practice depends on the form epitomized by 
courts and lawyers as a foil.”  
Third, our study has revealed that, by adopting the UNGPs framework, Barrick has 
developed a new form of privatization of the dispute, which amounts to a corporate counter-
mobilization strategy that we call ‘privatized remedy’. This strategy consists in devising law-
like corporate policies and structures (e.g. grievances mechanisms and due diligence 
processes) for dispute management and resolution formally similar but alternative to the legal 
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system. The findings are consistent with other studies in which company-led grievance 
mechanisms inspired by the UNGPs were described as inappropriate and ineffective (SOMO, 
2014; Kaufman and McDonnell, 2016) - some also involving Barrick (Human Rights Clinics, 
2015; Coumans, 2017; Mining Watch Canada, 2017). However, these other cases were taking 
place in so-called areas of limited statehood (Borzel and Risse, 2010). In this sense, 
operational grievance mechanisms offered the victims some form of remedy that they would 
have otherwise unlikely received.  
Our data has revealed that the adoption of this dispute privatization strategy followed 
a period in which the Chilean state and legal system were very active (Phase II - legalization 
of the dispute); the community had filed legal claims against Barrick and the SMA 
investigation was still ongoing. As already mentioned, this form of ‘privatized remedy’ 
appears as a form of ‘bargaining in law’s shadows’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979). 
Drawing on Edelman (2016), we found that this form of ‘managerialization’ of human rights 
was enabled by a context of legal ambiguity and uncertainty (the suspension of the Pascua-
Lama project). Effectively, the implementation of the UNGPs in the Pascua-Lama case 
weakened rights mobilization and divided the affected community, giving Barrick greater 
control over the dispute as compared to complaints handled through the formal legal system.  
Although the UNGPs explicitly state that operational-level grievance mechanisms 
should not be used “to preclude access to judicial or other non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms” (Principle 29), this statement is ambiguous. Barrick could claim that the 
company is not precluding access to justice. On the contrary, it is implementing due diligence 
and operational grievances mechanisms in accordance to the UNGPs. In effect, as Edelman 
(2016: 39) noted, the major risk with this process of managerialization of law is that 
ineffective or indeed counterproductive human rights corporate strategies come to be widely 
accepted and promoted by policy-makers, legal institutions and administrative agencies as 
‘indicia of compliance’ with human rights laws without evaluating their effectiveness. 
Based on our analysis of the Pascua-Lama case, we suggest policy-makers to be 
dubious of the ‘new governance’ turn in BHR policies embodied by the UNGPs, which is 
advocating a stronger regulatory role of business organizations. While there is an argument 
for operational grievances mechanisms to be implemented in areas of limited statehood, 
ideally engaging the victims or their representative in a truly participatory process (Kaufman 
and McDonnell, 2016), we suggest that in most other cases this process risks to follow a 
business “compensatory logic” (Thompson, 2017: 60), rather than promoting effective 
remediation. Thus, our recommendation to policy-makers is to strengthen domestic 
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governance by enhancing rigid and prescriptive legislative rules for business organizations to 
avoid legal ambiguity, strengthen specialized tribunals and administrative agencies. They 
could also demand multinational business organizations that are serious about human rights 
to lobby for legislative changes in all the countries in which they operate, rather than focusing 
mainly on voluntary transnational standards and principles, bypassing the state.  
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2017) 
Barrick Provides Update on Pascua-Lama Project 
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innovative-water-management/ (accessed 15th March, 2017)  
Barrick Provides Update on Pascua-Lama Project https://www.barrick.com/news/news-
details/2018/Barrick-Provides-Update-on-Pascua-Lama-Project/default.aspx (accessed 
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20th September, 2018) 
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/barrick-reaches-deal-with-pascua-lama-opponents-
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2018)  
Communities express support for Pascua-Lama Project (2007) 
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http://barrick.q4cdn.com/808035602/files/pascua-lama/Communities-express-support-
for-Pascua-Lama-Project.pdf (accessed 5th May, 2017) 
Convenio entre Barrick Gold y Diaguita https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxtnKvkG-
C4&t=154s video documentary, 8 minutes (accessed 23rd May, 2017) 
Corte Suprema invalida autorización de cierre temporal de Pascua Lama Diario 
Financiero (2014) https://www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/mineria/corte-suprema-invalida-
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23rd January, 2018) 
Coordinadora por la defensa del agua y la vida (2010) “Pascua Lama: Barrick destruye 
glaciares y usurpa territorios ancestrales” http://www.derechoalagua.cl/mapa-de-
conflictos/pascua-lama-barrick-destruye-glaciares-y-usurpa-territorios-ancestrales/ 
(accessed 4th May, 2017) 
Estrada, D. (2009). ENVIRONMENT-CHILE: Activists Try to Block Start of Pascua 
Lama Mine. Inter-Press Service. Accessed 2nd September, 2016 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/05/environment-chile-activists-try-to-block-start-of-
pascua-lama-mine/  
Diaguita Agricultural Communities of the Huascoaltinos and Their Members v. Chile, 
IACHR Petition 415/07, Report 141/09, 30 
Diaguitas denuncian que fueron usados por Barrick y que operadores ambientalistas 
recibieron millonarias sumas de la minera https://www.elciudadano.cl/medio-
ambiente/diaguitas-denuncian-fueron-usados-barrick-operadores-ambientalistas-
recibieron-millonarias-sumas-la-minera/02/09/  (accessed 9th February, 2018) 
El acuerdo entre Barrick Gold y las comunidades indígenas 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJuX2punplc video CNN news interview with 
Group C lawyer Lorenzo Soto after MoU announcement, 25 minutes (accessed 9th 
September, 2018) 
Ficha del Proyecto: Modificaciones Proyecto Pascua Lama http://seia.sea.gob.cl/seia-
web/ficha/fichaPrincipal.php?modo=ficha&id_expediente=1048260 (accessed 10th 
May, 2017) 
Financial Post (2016). ‘Barrick Gold takes home Social Responsibility Award’, 9 June, 
http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/barrick-gold-takes-home-social-
responsibility-award, accessed 10th February, 2018. 
From the archives: Behind Barrick's Pascua-Lama meltdown in the Atacama desert 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/high-and-
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dry/article18134225/ (accessed 15th September, 2018) 
Getting it right: A look at the mine approval process 
http://barrickbeyondborders.com/mining/2012/01/getting-it-right-a-look-at-the-mine-
approval-process/ (accessed 15th March, 2017) 
Giving Communities a Voice https://3blmedia.com/News/CSR/Giving-Communities-
Voice (accessed 15th September, 2018) 
Gold’s costly dividend, Human Rights Watch (2011) 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/02/01/golds-costly-dividend/human-rights-impacts-
papua-new-guineas-porgera-gold-mine  (accessed 9th June, 2018) 
Human Rights policy, Barrick Gold 
https://barrick.q4cdn.com/788666289/files/governance/Barrick-Human-Rights-
Policy.pdf  (accessed 10th December, 2017) 
Memorándum de entendimiento, Barrick Gold 
https://barricklatam.com/barrick/presencia/pascua-lama/comunidad/memorandum-de-
entendimiento/2014-10-10/092526.html (accessed 10th December, 2017) 
No se acreditó daño a glaciares: Tribunal rechazó demanda contra Compañía Minera 
Nevada SpA. por proyecto Pascua Lama https://www.tribunalambiental.cl/no-se-
acredito-dano-a-glaciares-tribunal-rechazo-demanda-contra-compania-minera-nevada-
spa-por-proyecto-pascua-lama/ (accessed 9th December, 2017 
Our Commitment to Human Rights 
http://www.barrick.com/responsibility/society/human-rights/our-
commitment/default.aspx, accessed 16 March 2017. 
Pascua Lama: Comienzan alegatos por recurso de protección contra Barrick y el Estado 
por contaminación https://www.elciudadano.cl/organizacion-social/pascua-lama-
comienzan-alegatos-por-recurso-de-proteccion-contra-barrick-y-el-estado-por-
contaminacion/10/19/ (accessed 9th January, 2018) 
Pascua Lama y el afán de borrar los límites https://www.ocmal.org/pascua-lama-y-el-
afan-de-borrar-los-limites/ (accessed 14th January 2018) 
PASCUA LAMA: El Llanto de la Montaña 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZ1dVHHv52k&t=144s video documentary, 115 
minutes (accessed 6th May, 2017) 
Pascual Lama: El convenio entre Barrick y comunidades diaguitas 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_aZ70c8SZM CNN news interview with Group C 
leader and mediator of MoU process after MoU announcement - 20 minutes (accessed 
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10th September, 2018) 
Proceso de Trabajo del Pueblo Diaguita (Valle del Huasco) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzaZTjoQ8pM&t=1604s (accessed 19th August, 
2017)  
 
Protest Barrick http://protestbarrick.net/article.php@id=570.html  
Real-Time Water Monitoring Promotes Transparency At Pascua-Lama 
https://www.barrick.com/news/news-details/2017/Real-Time-Water-Monitoring-
Promotes-Transparency-At-Pascua-Lama/default.aspx (accessed 10th September, 2018) 
Special report on Pascua Lama http://barrickbeyondborders.com/mining/2009/09/a-
special-report-on-pascua-lama/ (accessed 15th March, 2017) 
Sed de oro https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=__gLi277sb4 video documentary, 74 
minutes (accessed 14th March, 2017) 
Total rechazo a proyecto Pascua Lama en encuesta de www.chanarcillo.cl 
http://chanarcillo.cl/notas_ver.php?idnota=1243 (accessed 10th May, 2017) 
Tribunal escuchó alegatos en reclamación contra la Superintendencia del Medio 
Ambiente por rechazar Programa de Cumplimiento Ambiental de Pascua Lama 
https://www.tribunalambiental.cl/minera-alega-contra-la-resolucion-en-que-la-
superintendencia-rechazo-el-programa-de-cumplimiento-ambiental-de-pascua-lama/ 
(accessed 10th May, 2017) 
UPDATE 3-Barrick strikes deal with Pascua-Lama mine opponents  
https://www.reuters.com/article/barrick-gold-pascua/update-3-barrick-strikes-deal-
with-pascua-lama-mine-opponents-idUSL1N0OE0PS20140528 (accessed 10th 
September, 2018) 
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Table 2: Sources of Information and Type and Amount of Data Obtained in Each Category 
 
How the data were used in the study 
Legal, Corporate and NGO 
documents and Reports 
(approx. 520 pages) 
Antecedents of the Pascua Lama gold mine project and the conflict. 
Development of a historical and chronological account of the conflict between the 
Pascua Lama gold mine project and the Huasco Valley community. 
Analysis of state, corporate, community and NGO perspectives of the Pascua Lama gold 
mine. 
Report on process of signing MoU Agreement between Barrick and Community. 
MoU for Due Diligence Agreement between Barrick and Community 
Human rights impact assessment. 
Analysis of Barrick Gold’s CSR and due diligence related strategies. 
Analysis of NGO and activist strategies towards the mine. 
Analysis of local community engagement and resistance to Barrick Gold.  
Historical account of how the gold mine was approved by the Chilean State. 
Legal complaint files to courts against Pascua Lama. 
Court rulings and reports. 
Articles from the media 
between 2011 - 2019 
(approx. 130 pages) 
Analysis of the conflict from business, mainstream and activist press sources. 
Development of a historical and chronological account of the conflict between the 
Pascua Lama gold mine project and the Huasco Valley community. 
Academic articles 
(approx. 110 pages) 
Analysis of anti-mining movements’ strategies in the Huasco Valley. 
Analysis of impact of the Barrick Gold’s CSR and due diligence strategies in the Huasco 
Valley.   
Undergraduate theses 3 
theses (approx. 500 
pages) 
Analysis of local community history, identity and social ties. 
Analysis of impact of the Barrick Gold’s CSR and Due Diligence strategies in the Huasco 
Valley.  
Social media and 
Blogpost discussions 
(approx. 25 pages) 
Analysis of community and activist perspectives towards Barrick. Gold and its CSR and 
due diligence related strategies. 
Current legal developments regarding conflict. 
Video documentaries and 
reports (approx. 5 hours) 
Visual historical analysis of the conflict and of corporate influence. Strategies from 
community, activist and corporate perspectives. 
Reports on legal challenges and outcomes. 
Open interviews (74 
interviews with 53 
interviewees) 
Characterization of Barrick Gold’s strategies to influence and convince the local 
community for a social licence. 
Characterization of local community and activist’s resistance strategies to the Pascua 
Lama project. 
Understanding of local dynamics between community groups in relation to Pascua 
Lama. 
Characterization of local community identity vis a vis their perceptions of the Pascua 
Lama project. 
Direct observation (12 
days of direct 
observation) 
Characterization of local community identity vis a vis their perceptions of the Pascua 
Lama project. 
Characterization of Barrick Gold’s strategies to influence and convince the local 
community for an SLO. 
Characterization of local community and activist’s resistance strategies to the Pascua 
Lama project. 
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